This is The Mechanics of Meaning, pt. II.

Presented Pierluigi Miraglia

Abstract: This will be the conclusion of a previous presentation titled “The Mechanics of

Meaning”. It will focus on the section covering Donald Davidson, which I had thought of as the

main focus but ended up not covering because of time. But since the opportunity has arisen, I

want to spend more time on the central concern Davidson held around meaning, reference and

truth, the central notions in contemporary philosophy of language.

We will focus most closely on these characteristics of Davidson’s thinking about the theory of

meaning:

● Davidson’s holistic conception of truth and meaning

● The centrality of the concept of belief

● The structure of interpretation in “making sense of others”

● The “principle of charity”

● The myth of radically distinct conceptual schemes

● Finally, we should consider how these insights bear upon the current debate about

“artificial understanding”.

The interesting thing is that Davidson arrives at a conception of meaning that may seem quite

distant from the original positivist methodology of analytical philosophy: meanings,

representations and in general intentional content are social and communicative features, not

easily reducible to behavioristic or physicalist constructions.

Reading: Pierluigi's paper "Davidson on the theory of meaning, holism and interpretation".